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the assurance that medical schools are producing doc-
tors with the correct competencies at an appropriate
standard.
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Is the private finance initiative dead?
It may have failed in the United Kingdom, but that won’t stop it being exported
Forhealth professionals working in hospitals thathad been starved of investment for decades,often in buildings that were crumbling around
them, the United Kingdom’s private finance initiative
(PFI) must have seemed like a dream come true.
Rather than finding the money up front to rebuild
hospitals, managers could enter into a contract with a
private company or a consortium to finance the
building and guarantee that the facilities would be
maintained long into the future. In turn the hospital
trust would pay an annual fee to cover the costs of
financing the project (adjusted for the risk assumed
by the private company) and of maintenance.
Suddenly it became possible to escape the constraints
imposed by buildings that, in many cases, had been
designed to meet the needs of the population a
century earlier.
The initial enthusiasm by many hospital boards
was easy to understand, as the Department of Health
made it clear that this was the only way to fund big
capital developments. Yet from the inception of this
initiative in the NHS there have been voices of
caution, most notably Professor Allyson Pollock
who, as a consequence, has suffered personalised
attacks by those advocating PFI.1 One of the potential
drawbacks to which Professor Pollock drew attention
was that the new facilities funded through PFI
almost invariably provided less capacity than those
they were intended to replace.2 Another was that the
contracts were extremely expensive (or seemed to be,
given that they were shrouded in commercial secrecy)
and were not supported by convincing economic
arguments.3
Recent developments suggest that the experimen-
tal use of PFI in funding health care in the United
Kingdom may be coming to an end. The first is the
abandonment of the flagship west London develop-
ment, which sought to create an important new teach-
ing hospital complex by merging several specialist
hospitals. There are many reasons for the failure of this
project. But, overall, it was simply too complicated for a
health system in which—in the name of local
responsiveness—those responsible for purchasing care
(along with other interested parties) have become
hopelessly fragmented. This has many implications.
Perhaps the greatest is the question of how the NHS,
meant to be led by primary care in future, can hope
to develop a substantial programme of capital
investment.
The second sign that political enthusiasm for PFI
may be waning is the recognition of the initiative’s true
costs to the NHS and to contractors. The House of
Commons Public Accounts Committee has drawn
attention to the large profits made by the private con-
tractor which built the Norfolk and Norwich hospital.4
The high transaction costs of bidding for contracts are,
however, driving many potential contractors out of the
market.5
The fundamental flaw at the heart of the PFI
scheme is its lack of flexibility. As the pace of change in
the delivery of health care becomes ever faster, manag-
ers should think twice about signing long term
contracts that would levy heavy penalties for even
minor changes in building projects. Indeed, one senior
NHS manager has argued that new hospitals should
have an anticipated lifetime of only 5-10 years.6 Such
short term contracts are unlikely to interest private
investors, unless they are accompanied by very high
premiums.
The most serious threat, however, may be one that
few people had anticipated. The UK government has
set itself two fiscal rules. The first is that over the
economic cycle it should not borrow to cover current
spending. The second is that net debt should not
exceed 40% of the gross domestic product. The first,
known as (Chancellor of the Exchequer) Gordon
Brown’s “golden rule,” differentiates between current
spending and capital spending. The Treasury recog-
nises that the government has a duty to maintain the
level of investment required to meet the economy’s
needs and to ensure that the public capital stock is kept
in good condition to maintain competitiveness and
sustain public services.7 The second fiscal rule makes
no distinction between borrowing for current spending
and borrowing to finance investment. Net debt is now
around 35% of gross domestic product, projected in
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the budget in March 2005 to rise to 37% by 2008,
assuming that projected economic growth will be
achieved.
The Financial Times published an article this
spring suggesting that the Office for National
Statistics (ONS) was about to reclassify PFI projects.8
Although ONS issued a rebuttal, stating that it “has
not taken any decision to change the treatment of Pri-
vate Finance Initiative schemes in the public finances”
as “the element of PFI debts that should be recorded
within Public Sector Debt, is an extremely complex
and difficult matter,” it acknowledged that “ONS has
recognised for some time that estimates need to be
made and we have been continuously expanding our
ability to cover PFI activities and explore possible
sources of information.”9
This is important because funds for PFI are treated
as “off balance sheet” financing and appear as
“additional expenditure” to public sector expenditure
and are not currently included in the government bal-
ance sheet calculations of net debt. Should the Office
for National Statistics change the rules, a major
component of capital spending under these contracts
could be reclassified as debt. This could easily lead to a
breach of the second rule, removing the main justifica-
tion for the PFI model.
If the private finance initiative dies in the United
Kingdom it may still have a life beyond these shores.
Rather like general practice fundholding, it has created
a cadre of experts who can now offer their services to
the rest of the world. The United Kingdom may, once
again, be at least as successful in exporting its failures
as its successes.
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Staphylococcus aureus, Panton-Valentine leukocidin,
and necrotising pneumonia
A rare but often lethal cocktail that can complicate flu
Panton-Valentine leukocidin (PVL) is one ofmany toxins produced by Staphylococcus aureus.Structurally similar to  haemolysin, this
leukocidin comprises two subunits (F and S) that
together are leukocidal and dermonecrotic.1 Intermix-
ing of  haemolysin and the subunits of PVL produces
toxin molecules with varying cellular affinities and
destructive capability, even when the staphylococci
may be otherwise sensitive to antibiotics such as methi-
cillin. The death of a fit young soldier in the United
Kingdom earlier this year from toxicity to PVL
illustrated the extent of that capability.2
Infection with PVL producing staphylococci is rare.
Fewer than 2% of clinical isolates of S aureus examined
in the United Kingdom in 2002-3 had the genes to
produce the leukocidin, although it was found in 4.6%
of samples from infections of skin and soft tissue.3 Fur-
thermore, “pure” disease caused by those S aureus bac-
teria that produce PVL is rarely life threatening. It
presents as recurrent furunculosis or abscesses, it may
be either sensitive or resistant to methicillin, and it can
be difficult to eradicate among carriers. Three new and
more virulent staphylococcal syndromes associated
with the leukocidin—purpura fulminans, skin sepsis,
and necrotising pneumonia—have been recognised
recently, however.
Purpura fulminans due to PVL producing
methicillin sensitive S aureus (MSSA) has a mortality
of 60% despite such sensitivity.4 Skin sepsis due to
community acquired methicillin resistant S aureus
(MRSA) occurs in patients without recent contact with
healthcare facilities or known risk factors for such
infection. Transmission during close physical contact
causes outbreaks in prisoners, military personnel,
schoolchildren, and athletes.5 Although these bacterial
strains are resistant to methicillin, they are, at least,
usually sensitive to more antibiotics than hospital
strains.
The third manifestation of more serious disease
caused by PVL is necrotising pneumonia, which is
often lethal. It has been reported in America, Australia,
Europe, and the Far East. The pneumonia often arises
from bloodborne spread of organisms from infected
tissue and can follow viral respiratory infections, espe-
cially influenza.
Strains of S aureus that produce PVL have a
particular affinity for basement membrane exposed by
desquamated ciliated epithelium, and they rapidly
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